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Hersh, Seymour. Chain of Command: The Road
from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib. New York: HarperCollins, 2004. 394pp. $36.95

Seymour Hersh continues with his latest work his journey as a man with an
agenda. Released in September 2004, it
is a compilation of articles published in
The New Yorker, with additional information intended to present a congruent, as well as compelling, story about
the Bush administration’s efforts to
wage a worldwide war on terrorism.
That Hersh is a fan neither of the president and his closest aides nor of the
Iraq war is made abundantly clear from
the opening pages. As a consequence,
Chain of Command has drawn heavy
criticism from those who are either administration loyalists or ideologically
supportive of the Global War on Terror
despite its unconventional and violent
nature. Conversely, the president’s political opponents and others who oppose war on any number of grounds
have heralded Hersh’s book as the latest
efforts of a quixotic protagonist sworn
to bring truth into the light. The former
have assailed the book for its perceived
inaccuracies and lack of credible
sources, while the latter have lauded it
for exposing programs and decisions
that appear inimical to deep-seated
American beliefs about decency and
honesty.
This book is clearly a polemic, intended
to draw attention to Hersh’s concerns
over what he sees as an abuse of power
at the highest levels of a government
seemingly obsessed with a vision for
Iraq and its Muslim neighbors that may
be out of step with traditional American ideals. Whether you agree or disagree with Hersh’s assessments and
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conclusions, Chain of Command is a
work every serious student of U.S. national security should read, because he
raises important fundamental and
somewhat disquieting questions: Who
is ultimately accountable for the prisoner abuses that occurred at Abu
Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay? What are
the moral and ethical obligations of
those in uniform to adhere to international norms of behavior when national
guidance appears at odds with, if not in
complete contradiction to, accepted
global standards?
Hersh also challenges his readers to
contemplate the effects of the secretary
of defense’s domination over the military conduct of the war on terror and
its ramifications on the future of civilmilitary relations. Secretary Rumsfeld
bent the military to his will in almost
every phase of the war on Iraq, with what
Hersh describes as disastrous results
both in Iraq (where an insurgency rages
on) and in the greater war on terror (in
which the architect of 9/11 remains
free). The reader is left to contemplate
what the obligations of senior military
leaders were and why they were not
more effective in making their voices
heard on strictly military matters. Further, what salient ethical issues arise
from jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations of the Iraq war?
Hersh reserves much of his vitriol for
the Bush administration’s handling of
the intelligence used to justify war on
Iraq. In a chapter titled “Who Lied to
Whom?” he recounts much of what has
come to light about the way intelligence
was “manipulated” to build a case. For
Hersh, the inability of U.S. intelligence
organizations to collect accurate intelligence about Iraq and al-Qa‘ida is nearly
as egregious as the manner in which
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that intelligence was analyzed and interpreted. He is clearly disturbed by the
apparent usurpation of national intelligence activities by the Department of
Defense. The reader is left with the nagging suspicion that further such consolidation may not be in the best interests
of the country’s leadership, since opposing opinions already appear to have
no voice.
Hersh concludes Chain of Command by
posing a troubling set of questions. “How
did eight or nine neo-conservatives who
believed that a war in Iraq was the answer to international terrorism get their
way? How did they redirect the government and rearrange long-standing
American priorities and policies with so
much ease?” Discerning readers must
look past the author’s bias and answer
for themselves. While it is arguable
whether this book will earn the stature
of My Lai 4, Hersh succeeds in confronting us with important questions
that force us to look harder at ourselves
and our country.
RON RATCLIFF

Captain, U.S. Navy (Retired)
Naval War College

Pierce, Terry C. Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies: Disguising Innovation. New York: Frank
Cass, 2004. 265pp. $115

Captain Terry Pierce is a serving naval
officer who has studied innovation at
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, under the supervision
of Stephen Rosen. This book appears to
be the author’s dissertation, written as
part of a series on strategy and history
edited by Colin Gray and Williamson
Murray.
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Beyond that, nothing about this book is
clear or straightforward, including the
title. The title leads one to think that
the book will examine how revolutionary technologies have transformed warfare, but the subtitle, “Disguising
Innovation,” should serve as a warning—nothing is as it first seems. This
work is a sociological study of how the
U.S. Navy and Marine Corps have
achieved what the author terms “disruptive innovations” (new ways of
combining technologies that create new
forms of warfighting) and sustaining
innovations (those that improve existing forms). Technology plays a distant
second fiddle to doctrine. Pierce’s major thesis is that the catalysts for disruptive innovation are senior military
officers. How these officers manage the
disruptive innovation process is key. He
shows that they establish small groups
to define the tasks that must be carried
out to conduct a new form of warfare,
ensure that like-minded officers are
promoted, and most intriguingly, disguise the disruptive innovation as
merely improvements to existing
modes, in order to avert ruinous opposition from entrenched interests. In
support of his thesis Pierce offers a
number of case studies, including amphibious warfare, Japanese and American carrier warfare in World War II,
and Marine maneuver warfare. A nice
twist is the inclusion of more recent
case studies like surface-land-attack
warfare and the Tactical Collaboration
Network.
After a promising first chapter in which
the author generally defines his terms
and surveys the existing literature on
disruptive innovation, however, comes
a nearly disastrous attempt to establish
a theoretical framework to support the
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